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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs’ opposition is misdirected.  Rather than address the federal statute that 
forecloses their claims, plaintiffs argue at length about the merits of those claims.  But the 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), applies to any claim that would require 
this Court to treat Facebook as the publisher of third-party content on its platform, and plaintiffs’ 
claims unquestionably would do so.  The statute and the overwhelming body of precedent 
interpreting it therefore require dismissal of these complaints.  The remaining problems are 
simply confirmation of this result: The absence of Article III standing and personal jurisdiction 
in Cohen deprive this Court of authority over that action.  And the radical and factually 
unsupported theories of liability advanced by the Force plaintiffs are both statutorily and 
constitutionally problematic.  Facebook takes terrorism seriously and is committed to curbing the 
spread of terrorist content online.  Simply stated, there is no place on Facebook’s platform for 
organizations that are engaged in terrorist activity or for content that expresses support for such 
activity.  But Facebook is not responsible for the deplorable terrorist acts that form the basis for 
plaintiffs’ claims.  
ARGUMENT 
I. The Communications Decency Act Requires Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Claims. 
Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the CDA.  Plaintiffs cannot evade that statute by pleading 
their claims under the ATA, under a provision-of-services theory, or under Israeli law.   
A. The CDA Applies Equally to ATA Claims. 
The Force plaintiffs first contend that their civil ATA claims fall within the federal 
criminal law exception to the CDA, Opp. at 26-27 & n.6, but that exception does not apply.  It 
states that the CDA shall not “be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of 
[title 47], chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of 
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title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1).  But here, plaintiffs have 
asserted claims under the ATA’s civil remedies provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2333; the criminal-law 
exception is therefore entirely irrelevant.  See Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 
12, 23 (1st Cir. 2016) (rejecting argument that a civil suit under the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act fell within the criminal law exception); Obado v. Magedson, No. 
CIV. 13-2382 JAP, 2014 WL 3778261, at *8 (D.N.J. July 31, 2014), aff’d, 612 F. App’x 90 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (“[T]he CDA exception for federal criminal statutes applies to government 
prosecutions, not to civil private rights of action under stat[utes] with criminal aspects.”) 1 
B. The CDA Applies to Claims Based on the Alleged “Provision of Services.” 
The Force plaintiffs next contend that their ATA claims2 are based on the “provision of 
services, not ‘objectionable content’” and thus fall outside the scope of the CDA.  Opp. at 27. 
See Def.’s Combined Mem. of Points & Authorities in Supp. of Mots. to Dismiss at 12–14.  But 
semantics cannot overcome the broad immunity afforded by the CDA.  As plaintiffs themselves 
allege, Facebook offers “communications services.”  Force Am. Compl. ¶¶ 95, 97.  It is “in the 
business of making [its] facilities available to disseminate the writings composed, the speeches 
made, and the information gathered by others.”  Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 
                                                
1 Plaintiffs also contend that the ATA “tacit[ly] limited” the CDA because “the ATA was 
enacted later and amended (most recently via JASTA a few months ago).”  Opp. at 27 n.6.  But 
the ATA was enacted in 1992, see Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, title X, 
§ 1003(a)(4), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4522 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2333), four years before the 
CDA, see Pub. L. No. 104-104, title V, § 509, Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 137 (codified at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230).  And although Congress recently created secondary liability for the ATA, nothing in that 
legislation indicated an intent to disturb the CDA.  See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662 (2007) (“We will not infer a statutory repeal unless the later statute 
expressly contradicts the original act or unless such a construction is absolutely necessary … in 
order that the words of the later statute shall have any meaning at all.” (internal quotation marks 
and alterations omitted)); see also Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 810 (2010) (refusing to imply 
a repeal of a comprehensive statutory immunity without “clear and manifest” evidence of such 
intent).  
2 Plaintiffs do not make this argument with respect to their claims under Israeli law.  Opp. at 26. 
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(4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, §113, at 803 (5th 
ed. 1984)).  Thus, however artfully plaintiffs now try to describe them, plaintiffs’ allegations 
about Facebook’s “services” all stem from HAMAS’s alleged use of those services to post 
objectionable content.  Indeed, the amended complaint is filled with examples of this alleged 
objectionable content.  See Force Am. Compl. ¶ 3; ¶¶ 100–155.  Holding Facebook liable for 
such use would fall squarely within the CDA’s prohibition on “treat[ing] [Facebook] as the 
publisher” of that third-party content.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  As plaintiffs do not allege that 
Facebook played any role in the creation or development of that content, the CDA prohibits the 
suit.  Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 2015). 
Plaintiffs also cannot escape the CDA by alleging that Facebook has the “tools, and can 
develop additional tools as well by which it can identify, flag, review, and remove HAMAS 
Facebook accounts.”  Force Am. Compl. ¶ 544.  As numerous circuit court decisions make clear, 
the CDA bars challenges to “features that are part and parcel of the overall design and operation 
of the website” just as surely as it bars challenges to the treatment of particular postings.  See 
Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 21; see also Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 
2003) (“The only question then, is whether holding AOL liable for its alleged negligent failure to 
properly police its network for content transmitted by its users … would ‘treat’ AOL ‘as the 
publisher or speaker’ of that content.  We agree with the District Court that it would.”).  Such 
decisions “reflect choices about what content can appear on the website and in what form, [and] 
are editorial choices that fall within the purview of traditional publisher functions.”  Jane Doe 
No. 1, 817 F.3d at 21.  
The district court in Fields v. Twitter, Inc., No. 16-CV-00213-WHO, 2016 WL 6822065 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2016), recently rejected (for a second time) this same “services” theory in 
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relation to the CDA.  After affording plaintiffs an opportunity to amend, the court concluded that 
“no amount of careful pleading” could save plaintiffs’ claims from dismissal.  Id. at *1.  The 
Fields plaintiffs’ theory that “Twitter provided ISIS with material support by allowing ISIS 
members to sign up for accounts, not by allowing them to publish content,” was still, in 
substance, an attempt to hold Twitter liable for ISIS content on the platform.  Id.  The court 
explained that “Twitter’s decisions to structure and operate itself as a platform … allow[ing] for 
the freedom of expression [of] hundreds of millions of people around the world, and, through its 
hands-off policy, allowing ISIS to obtain dozens of accounts on its social network, reflect 
choices about what [third-party] content can appear on [Twitter] and in what form.”  Id. at *6 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Where such choices form the basis of a complaint, dismissal 
under the CDA is required.  See id. 
Moreover, the Fields amended complaint—like the Force amended complaint—“still 
focuse[d] on ISIS’s objectionable use of Twitter and Twitter’s failure to prevent ISIS from using 
the site, not its failure to prevent ISIS from obtaining accounts.”  Id. at *7.  That was “no 
surprise,” as “their claims [we]re inherently tied up with ISIS’s objectionable use of Twitter, not 
its mere acquisition of accounts.”  Id.  The gravamen of the Fields amended complaint was “not 
that Twitter provides material support to ISIS by providing it with Twitter accounts, but that 
Twitter d[id] so by allowing ISIS to use Twitter ‘to send its propaganda and messaging out to the 
world and to draw in people vulnerable to radicalization.’”  Id. (quoting second amended 
complaint).  The same is true here.  The gravamen of the Force amended complaint is not that 
Facebook provides material support to HAMAS by providing accounts or “services,” but that 
Facebook does so by allowing HAMAS to send its propaganda and messaging out to the world.  
See, e.g., Force Am. Compl. ¶ 110.  That theory is barred by the plain language of § 230(c)(1).   
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None of the supposed “factual[] distinct[ions]” between this case and Fields warrants a 
different application of the CDA.  Contra Opp. at 29.  It is wholly irrelevant to the CDA analysis 
whether the attack in Fields was accomplished by one or more attackers and whether the 
attackers actually used Twitter.  See id.  The question for the CDA analysis is whether the claims 
alleged would require the court to treat the defendant “as the publisher or speaker” of third-party 
content.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  If so, then the CDA bars the suit.  See Ricci, 781 F.3d at 27 
(“[I]f GoDaddy is being sued in its capacity as a provider of an ‘interactive computer service,’ it 
is immune from defamation liability under the Communications Decency Act.”). 
Unable to distinguish Fields, the Force plaintiffs resort to asserting, ipse dixit, that 
“Fields was plainly wrongly decided and an outlier.”  Opp. at 29.3  Yet plaintiffs identify no 
decision that reaches the opposite conclusion.  See id.  Indeed, in their entire opposition, 
plaintiffs cite only one CDA case besides Fields, id. at 26, and that decision recognized that 
“state and federal courts around the country have ‘generally interpreted Section 230 immunity 
broadly, so as to effectuate Congress’s ‘policy choice … not to deter harmful online speech 
through the … route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other 
parties’ potentially injurious messages.’”  Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 
1011, 1016 (N.Y. 2011) (quoting Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 
(1st Cir. 2007)).  It is plaintiffs’ crabbed view of the CDA that is the outlier, not Fields. 
C. The CDA Applies to Israeli Law Claims Brought in American Courts. 
In a final bid to evade the CDA, plaintiffs assert that the CDA “does not have 
extraterritorial application, and does not provide immunity to Facebook for its activities abroad, 
particularly as to plaintiffs’ claims under Israeli law.”  Opp. at 31.  But this case does not 
                                                
3 Plaintiffs address only the first decision in Fields v. Twitter, Inc., No. 16-CV-00213-WHO, 
2016 WL 4205687 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2016) (“Fields I”), even though the second was decided 
before they served their opposition. 
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implicate extraterritoriality issues because it involves an entirely domestic application of U.S. 
law.  Plaintiffs have asked this Court to treat Facebook—a U.S. company, facing claims in a U.S. 
court—“as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), and only a domestic application of the CDA is required to 
dismiss their claims.  Under the Supreme Court’s clear precedent, the “focus” of the CDA is to 
provide immunity to Internet service providers, and doing so in this case is an entirely domestic 
exercise.  See Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255, 266 (2010). 
Plaintiffs offer no contrary authority or argument.  As Facebook explained in its opening 
brief, both the Ninth and D.C. Circuits have applied the CDA to claims involving content posted 
abroad.  Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1356–57 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2003).  And Plaintiffs cite no 
precedents refusing to apply the CDA to foreign-law claims—an application that would, 
perversely, prevent courts from adjudicating federal and state claims but requires them to 
adjudicate foreign-law claims arising out of the same conduct.  Plaintiffs’ silence is telling. 
II. This Court Cannot Exercise Personal Jurisdiction over Facebook. 
Plaintiffs also have not met their burden to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction 
over Facebook.  None of their claims arises out of Facebook’s limited activities in New York, 
and plaintiffs’ “consent” theory cannot be reconciled with due-process requirements.   
A. New York’s Long-Arm Statute Does Not Permit Exercise of Specific 
Jurisdiction over Facebook in These Cases. 
Plaintiffs cursorily contend that “Facebook’s transact[ion] of any business within the 
state” and “tortious act within the state” support jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm statute.  
Opp. at 38.  But they again fail to connect their claims to any conduct in New York.  See Best 
Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 249–50 (2d Cir. 2007) (requiring “some articulable 
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nexus between the business transacted and the cause of action sued upon”); Barrett v. Tema Dev. 
(1988), Inc., 251 F. App’x 698 (2d Cir. 2007) (no long-arm jurisdiction “because, whether or not 
[the defendant] ‘transacted business’ in New York, [plaintiff’s] claims do not arise out of any 
New York transactions.”).  Plaintiffs do not (and cannot) contend that Facebook’s employees in 
New York were involved in registering or deactivating any of the accounts at issue or reviewing 
any reports of objectionable content cited here.  Plaintiffs have thus failed to allege any statutory 
basis for specific jurisdiction.  See Best Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.3d at 254–55 (allegations about 
the “donation section of the Website” were “essentially unrelated to the publication of 
defamatory comments on the Website” at issue in this lawsuit).   
B. Subjecting Facebook to Jurisdiction Here Would Violate Due Process. 
Even if plaintiffs had identified a statutory basis for jurisdiction, such jurisdiction could 
not be exercised consistent with the Constitution.  Plaintiffs do not contend that these actions 
arise out of any supposed “minimum contacts” Facebook has with New York, Walden v. Fiore, 
134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014), arguing instead that Facebook is subject to general jurisdiction in 
New York because it “maintains a substantial presence here and conducts extensive business 
activities here.”  Opp. at 39.  That theory is foreclosed by Daimler, however, which makes clear 
that such activities are not the “exceptional case” in which general jurisdiction exists outside a 
corporation’s principal place of business or place of incorporation.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 
S. Ct. 746, 761 n.14 (2014).  The “exceptional case” is one like Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. 
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), in which a Philippines company had ceased operations during World 
War II and had made Ohio its “principal, if temporary, place of business.”  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 
756.  Facebook’s limited New York activities do not approach this level.  See Mot. to Dismiss, 
Ex. A, Decl. of Jeannie Farren ¶ 6 (“[L]ess than 5% of Facebook’s total employees[] work in 
Facebook’s New York office”).  
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C. Facebook Did Not Consent to Personal Jurisdiction in New York. 
Plaintiffs also contend that Facebook “consented to general personal jurisdiction in New 
York when it registered to do business” here, Opp. at 37, but that argument would “risk 
unravelling the jurisdictional structure envisioned in Daimler and Goodyear,” Brown v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 634 (2d Cir. 2016), and raise additional problems under 
the Commerce Clause, Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 142 & n.108 (Del. 2016).  
Plaintiffs’ attempt to invoke New York’s business registration statutes in this manner is 
inconsistent with Brown4 and with normal deference to state laws.  See Brown, 814 F.3d at 634; 
see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237 (1998) (“A statute must be 
construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but 
also grave doubts upon that score.”).  Indeed, that the New York Legislature is currently 
considering a bill to provide expressly for general jurisdiction upon business registration, Opp. at 
38, confirms that the existing statutes do not do so.   
D. The ATA’s Venue Statute Does Not Justify the Exercise of Personal 
Jurisdiction in the Force Case. 
Unable to show any traditional basis for personal jurisdiction, the Force plaintiffs rely on 
the ATA’s service-of-process provision, Opp. at 7–8, but that provision does not waive personal 
jurisdiction.  While it is true that several courts have interpreted it as affording a statutory basis 
for nationwide personal jurisdiction,5 those cases do not grapple with the statutory language.  
Section 2334(a) is titled a “General Venue” provision, and it makes no mention of personal 
                                                
4 Plaintiffs assert that “[e]ven after Goodyear and Daimler, New York courts have held that 
registration in New York as a foreign corporation constitutes consent to personal jurisdiction for 
purposes of CPLR § 301,” Opp. at 37 & n.13, but they have not identified any New York Court 
of Appeals case to have done so, and that is what matters under Brown.  814 F.3d at 634.   
5 See, e.g., Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 176 F. Supp. 3d 264, 283–84 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); 
Strauss v. Crédit Lyonnais, S.A., 175 F. Supp. 3d 3, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); In re Terrorist Attacks 
on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
Case 1:16-cv-04453-NGG-LB   Document 31   Filed 01/13/17   Page 14 of 21 PageID #: 1029
9 
jurisdiction, even though other subsections of the same statute refer to “jurisdiction.”  Compare 
§ 2334(a) with §§ 2334(b), (d).  In light of the provision’s focus only on “venue,” it is difficult to 
read § 2334(a) to authorize the service of a summons to “establish[] personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(c).  Assuming nevertheless that such provision provides a 
statutory basis for jurisdiction, there are still constitutional barriers to hailing Facebook, an 
American defendant, into court in New York; the cases finding jurisdiction under the ATA to 
date have involved foreign—not American—defendants.  See Waldman v. Palestine Liberation 
Org., 835 F.3d 317, 331–34 (2d Cir. 2016) (Palestinian entities); In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 
11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 93 (2d Cir. 2008) (Saudi Arabian princes), abrogated on other grounds by 
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010).  That distinction matters, as any American defendant 
would have very different federalism-backed expectations than a foreign defendant about where 
in the United States it may be hailed into court.  See In re Terrorist Attacks, 538 F.3d at 93 (due 
process generally “mandates that a defendant’s ‘conduct and connection with the forum State are 
such that he should reasonably anticipate being [hailed] into court there”).  And in any event, 
even if the Force plaintiffs could establish personal jurisdiction for purposes of their ATA 
claims, that showing would not justify jurisdiction over the remaining claims.  See Wright & 
Miller, 4A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1069.7 (4th ed. 2016) (a plaintiff must show personal 
jurisdiction “over a defendant with respect to each claim she asserts”).  
III. The Cohen Plaintiffs Lack Article III Standing to Bring Their Suit. 
Much like they do with the CDA, the Cohen plaintiffs largely ignore Article III standing.  
They argue that they have a cognizable injury because “the Israeli statutes at issue were passed to 
protect the plaintiffs and impose a duty upon Facebook,” Opp. at 40, but the Supreme Court has 
already explained that a plaintiff does not “automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact requirement 
whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to 
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vindicate that right.”  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016), as revised (May 24, 
2016).  And plaintiffs’ assertion that their requested injunction “would likely affect the scope, 
intensity, and frequency of [terrorist] attacks” in Israel, Opp. at 40, is nowhere in their amended 
complaint and is entirely speculative in any event.  See, e.g., Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 805 F.3d 89, 
98 (2d Cir. 2015), as amended (Dec. 1, 2015) (concluding that invalidation of a bid selection 
would “fail to redress Allco’s injuries, as they [would] not make it ‘likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative,’ that Allco [would] eventually receive a Section 6 contract”).6  Plaintiffs’ alleged 
injury is caused by terrorists, not Facebook.7   
This Court’s decision in Greenberg v. Bush, 150 F. Supp. 2d 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), 
highlights the point.  There, plaintiffs attempted to sue the Executive Branch for its alleged 
support for Palestinian terrorist organizations.  Id. at 450, 455.  The Court commented: “It would 
be difficult to imagine a clearer example of a third party’s actions breaking the causal chain.  The 
gunshots and other violence complained of are fairly traceable to neither Defendants’ foreign 
policy decisions nor actions taken in accordance with those decisions.”  Id. at 455.  As in 
Greenberg, the Cohen plaintiffs have not alleged facts from which it could be reasonably 
inferred that, absent Defendants’ acts, “there is a substantial probability that Plaintiffs would not 
have been shot at by a third party,” nor that “if the court affords the relief requested, the asserted 
violent actions directed at the Plaintiffs will cease.”  Id.  Rather, plaintiffs seek “relief that no 
                                                
6 This is also not a case involving parens patriae standing, under which standing requirements 
may not apply as strictly.  See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 516-18 (2007).   
7 The Cohen complaint is easily distinguished from Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 
2013), where the plaintiffs were victims of HAMAS terrorist attacks and alleged that the 
defendant had transferred millions of dollars to Iran knowing that Iran was funneling money to 
Hamas “conditioned … on agreement by [Hamas] to conduct terrorist attacks on Israel and its 
residents,” id. at 92–93.  
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more directly and tangibly benefits them than the public at large” and therefore “fail to state an 
Article III case or controversy.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
IV. The Force Plaintiffs Have Failed to State A Claim Under Section 2333. 
Finally, in addition to all of the other pleading deficiencies in the complaints, the Force 
plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under the ATA. 
A. Plaintiffs Have Not Plausibly Alleged That Their Injuries Occurred “By 
Reason Of” Facebook’s Activities.  
To begin, plaintiffs cannot show that any of Facebook’s alleged conduct is the proximate 
cause of their injuries.  “[T]o say that one event was a proximate cause of another means that it 
was not just any cause, but one with a sufficient connection to the result.”  Paroline v. United 
States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2014).  It “is more restrictive than a requirement of factual cause 
alone.”  Id. at 1720.  Here, plaintiffs do not allege that access to Facebook was a but-for cause of 
the attack, much less that Facebook’s conduct was “a substantial factor in the sequence of 
responsible causation” leading to these particular attacks.  Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 
113, 123 (2d Cir. 2003).  Plaintiffs do not, for example, allege that any of the attacks in any way 
required the existence of Facebook to be carried out.  Instead, plaintiffs allege only that access to 
Facebook “strengthens HAMAS internally as an organization” and makes terrorist “attacks more 
likely,” Op. at 18, allegations that are far too general to establish proximate cause.  See, e.g., 
Fields, 2016 WL 6822065, at *9 (no proximate cause even though plaintiffs alleged that “Twitter 
provided ISIS with material support in the form of a powerful communication tool”); Gill v. 
Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“No single or total transfer [of money] 
highlighted by plaintiff establishes the requisite magnitude and temporal connection to the attack 
required to find that the Bank’s actions proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries.”).   
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B. Plaintiffs Have Not Plausibly Alleged Secondary Liability Under the ATA. 
Plaintiffs overreach when they argue that Facebook aided and abetted or conspired with 
HAMAS.  Opp. at 22–24.  JASTA creates liability only for those who “aid[] and abet[], by 
knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspire[] with the person who committed 
such an act of international terrorism,” not merely the organization that allegedly planned it or 
took credit for it.  See JASTA § 4 (emphasis added).  Here, that would be the individual 
perpetrators of the attacks, and plaintiffs make no such allegations.  But even if JASTA liability 
were broader, plaintiffs’ allegations about HAMAS would be insufficient. 
1. Facebook Did Not Aid and Abet HAMAS. 
Plaintiffs’ aiding and abetting claim fails for at least two reasons.  First, plaintiffs cannot 
establish substantial assistance to HAMAS under the Halberstam factors.  Plaintiffs do not 
contend—nor could they—that Facebook’s provision of services is “essential” to HAMAS’s 
activities.  See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  HAMAS operated for 
years before the Internet or Facebook was ever created, Force Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26, 517–18, and 
such services are not integral to its terrorist enterprise.  They are not like the “aid in transforming 
large quantities of stolen goods into ‘legitimate’ wealth” in Halberstam, nor like the sale of the 
photo used for a defamatory activity in Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1959).  See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484, 488.  Plaintiffs also do not contend—nor could 
they—that Facebook was present at HAMAS’s terrorist attacks or is in any special relationship 
with HAMAS.  See Opp. at 23.  And although plaintiffs may disagree with the way Facebook 
chooses to address reports of objectionable content on its platform, they cannot seriously contend 
that Facebook is “one in spirit” with HAMAS, Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484.  Plaintiffs thus 
cannot show substantial assistance. 
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Second, plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that Facebook knowingly provided any 
such assistance to HAMAS.  Plaintiffs contend that “Facebook at the very least ‘had a general 
awareness’ of its role in Hamas’s terrorist activities through Hamas’s use of Facebook’s platform 
and services” over time.  Opp. at 21.  But aiding and abetting liability requires more: “the 
defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at 
the time that he provides the assistance.”  705 F.2d at 477.  Plaintiffs have not and cannot allege 
such knowledge here: Facebook does not require proof of identification when users sign up for 
its services, see Force Am. Compl. ¶¶ 96–97, 547, and there is nothing illegal or tortious about 
offering a social-networking platform to the public under such terms.  Plaintiffs cannot rely on 
after-the-fact reports of alleged HAMAS content to establish the requisite knowledge.   
2. Facebook Did Not Conspire with HAMAS. 
In defense of their conspiracy claim, plaintiffs make only two arguments.  First, they 
contend that their pleading is sufficient because they “alleged very clearly that ‘Facebook 
conspired with HAMAS,’” Opp. at 24, but “a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice” to 
state a plausible claim to relief, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007).  
Second, they contend that Facebook’s supposed “pattern of turning a blind eye” amounts to 
“evidence of Facebook’s tacit agreement to provide services and resources to Hamas.”  Opp. at 
26.  But even assuming that Facebook turned a “blind eye”—which it did not—that would not be 
sufficient to establish an agreement, which is what plaintiffs must allege to prove a conspiracy.  
See King v. City of N.Y., No. 05 CV 3247 (JG), 2007 WL 959696 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007).  
Plaintiffs’ threadbare allegations do not state a plausible claim that Facebook somehow 
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“conspired” with terrorists to advance their aims.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566; Halberstam, 
705 F.2d at 481.8  
C. Plaintiffs Also Have Not Plausibly Alleged Direct Liability for an “Act of 
International Terrorism.” 
Finally, plaintiffs’ arguments in favor of direct liability only confirm the absence of such 
liability.  They assert that their allegations of scienter should be judged according to a “lenient 
standard” and deemed sufficient under Ahmad v. Christian Friends of Israeli Communities, No. 
13 CIV. 3376 JMF, 2014 WL 1796322 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2014).  Opp. at 14.  But, as Ahmad 
makes clear, the ATA requires that the defendant know both where the services are going and of 
the possibility that those services “would be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, violations 
of certain federal criminal statutes.”  Ahmad, 2014 WL 1796322, at *3; see also Weiss v. Nat’l 
Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 211–12 (2d Cir. 2014) (triable issue of fact where 
defendant knew it was providing money to a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization).  
Here, plaintiffs have not alleged that Facebook knew it was providing services to HAMAS to 
engage in terrorist activities.  Force Am. Compl. ¶¶ 554.  If scienter could be established by the 
allegations here, then almost any company offering services to the public could be liable for 
material support for terrorism.  That cannot be correct. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons and those set forth in Facebook’s Combined Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Motions to Dismiss, the Court should dismiss the amended 
complaints.  
                                                
8 These allegations are also far removed from those in Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 
571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).  There, the defendants allegedly furnished a “universal death and 
dismemberment plan” to families of Palestinian terrorists killed in service of the Intifada, 
conduct that could have no lawful, independent explanation.  See id. at 577, 584; see also Linde 
v. Arab Bank, PLC, Nos. 16-2119, 16-2134, 16-2098 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 2016) (appeal pending of 
subsequent judgment). 
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